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COMMITMENT PROCEDURES IN COLORADO
JANE WOODHOUSE
of the Denver Bar

Melodramatic literature abounds with lurid accounts of the
"railroading" of sane persons by scheming families or business
associates engaging in nefarious tricks to deprive the victim of
his property or to remove him from his rightful place in society
for wicked and insidious personal reasons. There still lurks in
the public mind some vestiges of the uneasy suspicion that "people as sane as you and I" are being committed secretly and illegally,
surreptitiously snatched from their homes and whisked off unceremoniously to an asylum from which there is no escape.
The history of this line of thinking is vividly presented in
The Mentally Ill in America by Albert Deutsch.' A comprehensive
historical survey of public attitudes, the growth of psychiatric
knowledge and understanding, the changing concepts of mental
illness and treatments, the mental health movement, and the development of statutory procedures in the different states, this
volume is a valuable source book for the reader concerned with
any phase of the subject.
From the days when the mentally disordered person was considered a menace to the community, incarcerated, chained and
tended by guards with whips, we have come to recognize him as
an individual afflicted with disease who, for his own welfare or
the safety of others, must be hospitalized for a short or lengthy
period of time against his will, in other words as a medico-legal
problem. From the days of Mrs. Julia Packard's commitment
under an Illinois statute allowing a husband to commit his wife
"without the evidence of insanity required in other cases," 2 we
are developing a system of medical, legal and judicial determination of mental status that more nearly meets the demands of psychiatric knowledge and public conscience. From the preoccupation
with fears of railroading and the hopelessness associated with
"insane asylums," the public is turning toward mental health
associations, learning facts, supporting necessary revision of the
laws, exploring with the medical profession the great universe
of knowledge, experience and research for preventive measures
and broader understanding of mental illnesses.
It is estimated that one out of every 12 children born in the
United States each year will sometime during his life suffer a
mental illness severe enough to require hospitalization. 3 At the
present time more than half the hospital beds in the country are
occupied by mental patients. There are about 680 mental hospitals
in the country and it costs the tax payers over five hundred mil'Doubleday, Doran & Co., Publisher (1938).
2 Statute enacted in 1851.
'National Association for Mental Health, Inc., April, 1952.
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lion dollars a year in operating costs alone. 4 The average daily
population of these mental hospitals is about 650,000 with average
annual new admissions and re-admissions totaling about 350,000.
The number of people hospitalized for mental illness is increasing
steadily and in addition to those who go to mental hospitals it is
estimated that 30% of the patients in general hospitals and 50%
of patients consulting general medical practitioners are suffering
from mental illness or physical illnesses associated with mental
illness and other personality disturbances.5
Sensationalism in the press hinting darkly of sinister motives
and "wrongful" commitments serves no constructive purpose, contributes nothing to the public understanding of the real problem,
and obscures the benefits to the patient and society which result
from close cooperation between the legal and medical professions
in necessary commitments.
Colorado, like every other state, is faced with a large annual
net increase in the number of patients requiring hospitalization
for mental reasons, concomitant with a scarcity of trained personnel, overcrowding in existing institutions, steadily mounting
costs, and consequent operating deficits.
The statute 6 under which the county courts of Colorado order
the commitment of an individual to a mental institution is believed
to be among the more enlightened in the country. This, however,
does not mean that it does not need thoughtful amendment or revision. Although the principal objective of this article is to present a discussion of commitment procedures, it is intended also to
point up some of the reforms or revisions considered desirable to
bring the law up to date with recent advances in psychiatry: to
modernize terminology and definitions, delete anachronisms, and
clarify ambiguities.
The confinement, adjudication and commitment of the mentally
ill are medico-legal problems charged with public interest. They
must be resolved administratively in terms of three paramount
considerations: (1) the health of the patient, (2) the protection
of his civil rights, and (3) the welfare of the community. With
these in mind and limiting ourselves to the purely civil matters
covered by the statute (as distinguished from proceedings in criminal cases) let us look at the step by step procedures.
Involuntary hospitalization may be accomplished in Colorado
in one of three ways: (1) by complaint in lunacy; (2) on petition
for order to hold and treat, (3) by emergency police procedure.
THE COMPLAINT IN LUNACY

Under §3, c. 105, any reputable person may file in the County
4During Congressional hearings on the National Mental
July 3, 1946, figures were presented to the Congress showing
8 million persons in the country were suffering from some
ness, and the cost to the nation including loss in earning
staggering figure of one billion dollars a year.
5National Association for Mental Health, Inc., supra.
'COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 105 (1935).

Health Act, passed
that approximately
form of mental illpower reaches the
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Court a duly verified complaint alleging that an individual is so
insane or distracted in his mind as to endanger his own person
or property or the person or property of another if allowed to go
at large, or that the individual is by reason of old age, disease,
weakness of mind, feebleness of mind or from any other cause
(such as chronic alcoholism) unable to manage and take care of
himself or his property without assistance, and therefore would
be likely to be deceived or imposed upon by artful or designing
persons. In the case of a mentally defective individual, the complaint alleges mental deficiency or feeblemindedness and inability
to receive instruction in the public schools. Ordinarily the complainant is a member of the family whose duty it becomes to sign
the necessary papers. By court rule in Denver and several other
counties, the complaint must be supported by a doctor's letter
recommending hospitalization and examination by the Commission.
This rule has the salutory effect of cutting to a minimum "spite"
actions and may be helpful if the good faith of the complainant
is ever questioned. In certain aggravated cases where a preliminary examination and supporting opinion from a doctor is virtually
impossible to obtain, the court may waive the letter and accept
some other evidence of need for hospitalization. This "other evidence" may be in the form of a petition signed by numerous neighbors, a statement of fact by apprehending police officers, a police
record for drunkenness sufficient on its face to indicate present
chronic alcoholism, or any other evidence satisfactory to the court.
PREPARATORY WORK

Preparation of the complaint, preliminary investigation and
arrangements for admission to a hospital pending hearing are
handled by the County Attorney, or in some of the small counties,
by the clerk of the county court. In addition, in Denver County
where the Commission sees an average of twelve to fifteen patients
per week, the County Attorney "authorizes" the complainant to
file and at the same time advises the court where the patient is,
where he may be confined pending the hearing and whether or not
the assistance of the Sheriff is required to move the patient to the
designated hospital. In some cases the patient is already in a
hospital or can remain at home pending the hearing, in which case
the commission meets at the home on the scheduled day.
Court costs for the hearing are $45, payable when the complaint is filed. Costs for hearings on indigent patients are paid
by the county. Costs of hospitalization pending the hearing are
paid by the patient, his estate if any, his relatives or the county
of his residence.
Upon the filing of the complaint .the court issues the appropriate orders. Where the patient for example is to be moved from
a private home to a hospital, the court issues an order to the
sheriff to take the individual into custody and transport him to
the hospital, where he is to be confined and cared for pending
examination and hearing by the commission. Copies of the com-
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plaint and order are served on the patient and the hospital.
The patient is entitled to five days notice of the time and place
of the hearing. Service is made by the sheriff on order of the court.
This notice is mandatory and cannot be waived.7 A hearing held
before the expiration of the five days is illegal and any subsequent proceedings or orders are held for naught. As a practical
matter the five days is always extended by the operation of Rule 6
of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that
in computing time of less than ten days Sundays and holidays are
excluded. Because of the serious shortage of hospital beds for the
mentally ill, purely custodial cases are an undue burden on the
limited staff and facilities of an institution geared to a treatment
program for the short term acute types of disorders. The financial
circumstances of the family are often pressing, and the cost of
the delay for statutory notice may run well over $100. However
at the present time there is no legally satisfactory means to determine in advance whether such notice is necessary or advisable.
The result is that the five-day notice is served on all alike, on the
chronic alcoholic who at the moment is sober (and convinced of his
ability to stay sober), on the senile who can read the words but
forgets from one sentence to the next, and on the mentally deficient
infant who never will learn to read. In "aggravated" cases the
court may waive service of such notice on recommendation of the
guardian ad litem.8 In the experience of Denver County this provision is rarely used, and then only upon request or recommendation of a psychiatrist who believes such notice may be harmful to
the patient. A definition of "aggravated" might clarify the
problem.
The commission, appointed by the court, consists of two doctors resident in the county, directed to examine the patient and
report to the court their answers to four statutory questions. The
court also appoints a guardian ad litem to represent the patient at
the hearing. In counties where there is only one doctor, the court
may appoint a doctor from an adjoining county or some reliable
person not a doctor. 9 Many practicing physicians hesitate to examine a patient for mental illness, even as to the less subtle forms
of derangement. However, resident psychiatrists are rarely located
in the smaller counties of the state, and so except in the larger
communities the task of determining insanity, incompetence or
mental deficiency falls upon the general practitioner. This problem
is somewhat alleviated by the practice of some of the smaller
county courts of sending patients in to the Colorado Psychopathic
Hospital at the University Medical Center, for psychiatric evaluation. In Denver, Pueblo, Colorado Springs and some other cities
the courts limit appointments to the commission to specialists in
psychiatry.
'Hultquist v. People, 77 Colo. 310, 236 P. 995; Okerberg v. People, 119 Colo.
529, 205 P. 2d 224.
'COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 105 § 2 (1935).
1 Op. cit., § 12.
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In Denver county the hearings are scheduled for Tuesday
afternoon each week. Because of the number of patients to be
seen on that one day, the doctors make a practice of examining
all patients sometime prior to the hearing. In this way difficult
or borderline cases are discovered and given more careful study
than some other types of cases require. This affords the additional
safeguard of examination on two different occasions.
Prior to the hearing at the request of the complainant and
with the approval of the attending physician, the court may allow
withdrawal of the complaint. It has been held that once the question of a person's competence or sanity has been raised by the filing
of a complaint, the public acquires an interest and is entitled to
have the matter determined according to law. 10 The most frequent
ground for withdrawal is the recovery or marked improvement of
the patient.
withdrawal is the recovery or marked improvement of the patient.
A hearing before the commission may be continued upon request of any interested person.
Witnesses may be subpoenaed to give testimony at the hearing. Relatives and friends who appear in behalf of the patient or
complainant may offer their opinions as to the patient's mental
condition.' 1 Attorneys appearing for the patient or his family
may elicit additional testimony to be considered by the doctors
in reaching their decision on diagnosis and recommendation to
be made to the court.
The hearings before the commission are closed to all except
persons with some natural and proper interest in the case. The
proceedings are informal and so far as possible are conducted in
a manner appropriate to the patient's status as a patient and not
as one charged with an offense. If a member of the hospital staff
is going to testify, he is usually the first called upon to give a medical history, diagnosis and recommendation, if any. Members of
the family and friends may be questioned as to their observations
and opinions, and are frequently consulted as to their desires in
the matter of care in a public or private institution. When the
doctors decide on the diagnosis and disposition of the case to be
recommended to the court, the hearing is concluded. The Report of
the Commission consists of Yes or No answers to four statutory
questions:
(1) Is the person complained against so insane or
distracted in h ---mind as to endanger h---- own person or
property, or the person or property of another, or others,
if allowed to go at large? (2) Is such person, by reason
of old age, disease, weakness of mind, or from any other
cause, incapable, unassisted, to properly manage and
self or h.... property? (3) Is such person
take care of h ....
"State ex rel. Paxton v. Guinotte, 257 Mo. 1, 165 S. W. 718, Anno.:
LRA (NS) 1191.
" Shapter v. Pillar, 28 Colo. 209, 63 P. 302.
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so mentally defective as to be incompetent to care for
h....self or h-.. property? (4) Does said person have
any personal or real estate ?12
An affirmative answer to any one of the first three questions
renders the patient "commitable," or more accurately "adjudicable." These questions are filled in and recommendation as to
commitment or custody is noted. The doctors sign the report
before proceeding to the next case. When all cases scheduled for
hearing have been examined, the commission returns to court
and the reports are filed. If the two doctors disagree on any particular case, they file separate reports and the court is13 then empowered to appoint a third member of the commission.
If the questions relative to the patient's mental condition are
all answered in the negative, the patient is discharged and upon
filing of the report the court enters an order dismissing the case.
Where one or more of these first three questions are answered
in the affirmative, the court enters an order adjudicating the patient insane, incompetent or mentally defective, and at the same
time orders commitment to an institution or custody to an individual.
OBJECTION MUST BE TIMELY

It has been held that the Court is not bound by the findings
or recommendation of the commission, but unless timely objection
is made with motion for leave to present
further evidence, the
14
court will proceed as outlined above.
Patients who are committed to a state or private institution
may be transported to the designated place by the sheriff, by a
member of the family or by private ambulance. Unless special
arrangements are made in advance the order will be directed to
the sheriff. Costs of transportation by the sheriff are figured on
a mittimus mileage schedule provided by statute. 15 Relatives are
usually billed for this expense and the trip from Denver to Pueblo
averages $30 per patient. Ambulance costs for one patient are
about $50; for two patients, $25 each.
Every patient adjudicated pursuant to the report of a lunacy
commission is entitled to a jury trial if his demand is filed within
five days of the order of adjudication (excluding Sundays and holidays). He may file his demand himself or it may be filed in his
behalf by any responsible person. It may be noted here that a
jury trial is available at no other time. One of the duties of the
guardian ad litem is to see that this right is protected and exercised in the proper case.
The word "proper" is used advisedly. At the present time,
without explicit judicial guidance in the form of Supreme Court
cases, the guardian ad litem exercises broad discretion in the perCOLO. STAT. ANN., C. 105 (1935) V. 4 § 6--(old volume).
"Ibid.
14 In
re People in Interest of Hill, 118' Colo. 571, 198 P. 2d 450.
"Loc. Cit., § 16.
12
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formance of his duties. 16 Where the patient demands a jury trial
at the time of the commission hearing or where the guardian ad
litem is for any reason dissatisfied with the report and recommendation of the commission, he will file the demand himself. In
some cases he will explain to the patient in detail his legal rights
and ascertain whether or not the patient understands the nature
of the inquiry into his mental condition, and will file the demand
if requested by the patient to do so. In other cases the guardian
ad litem, concluding that no beneficial or necessary purpose could
be served by giving such explanation, offers no more than perfunctory assistance or information.
In the absence of special request the jury trial is scheduled
for the next regular jury term. The court in its discretion may
order confinement in any suitable place pending trial. 1! The case
is prosecuted by the County Attorney in the name of the People
of the State of Colorado in the interests of the patient. The patient
is represented by his own private attorney or by counsel appointed
by the court. The trial is governed by the customary rules of evidence and civil procedure. The jury is required to answer the
four statutory questions submitted to them in the form of a special
verdict. The court is directed by statute to enter a decree conforming to the jury verdict. It is apparent from the precise wording of the statute that the jury is limited in its deliberations to
answering the questions and it is the function of the court alone
to determine whether or not confinement is necessary and if so, to
designate the suitable place of confinement. Although the right
of jury trial is waived after the expiration of five days from the
order of adjudication, it has been held that the jurisdiction of the
court in lunacy matters as in questions of alimony, and custody
of children, is continuing, and all proceedings, judgments and
orders are subject to change and modification on petition and
proper showing.18 Procedures for legal restoration to reason are
discussed later.
THE HOLD AND TREAT ORDER

The second type of involuntary hospitalization is known as
the Hold and Treat Order, issued by the court on petition alleging
need for hospitalization, diagnosis, treatment and care. The petition, like the complaint in lunacy, must be accompanied by a statement from a doctor. Court costs for filing petition are $5.00. This
method is appropriate and preferred in cases believed to require
only short term treatment. The order to hospitalize has no legal effect on the patient's capacity to perform legal acts. Release from
the order is on recommendation of the attending physician. If release is sought against medical advice the court may hear testimony
on a petition to release. If it appears to the court from such testi"See Hultquist v. People opp. cit.; Isham v. People, 262 P. 89, 82 Colo. 550.
"Loc. Cit., § 11.
"In re People in Interests of Hill, opp. cit.; Isham v. People, opp. cit.;
Hultquist v. People, opp. cit.
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mony that it would be unwise to release the patient the court may
refer the question to the commission. In the language of the statute, the patient May be confined under such order "until the judge
of the county court may determine whether or not an examination
into the mental condition of said person is desirable by the lunacy
commission." 19
EMERGENCY POLICE PROCEDURE

The third type of involuntary hospitalization is known as the
emergency police procedure. §3 of c. 105 provides that when a
law enforcement officer finds an insane or distracted person at
large, he may apprehend such person without an order of court.
The officer is required to present the patient forthwith before
the court, and the judge then determines whether or not the matter should be referred to the commission. If such is the case, the
court is empowered to order confinement in some suitable place
pending examination by the commission and to order the matter
set down for hearing as though a complaint had been filed. The
patient dealt with in this manner may be the transient victim of
amnesia, the deluded indigent soul picked up for shelter, the "furiously mad" individual threatening violence to himself or others.
The element of risk involved in this procedure stems from the
general proposition of law that the person so apprehended must
in fact be of unsound mind. 20 His apprehension is justified only
on that ground and it is therefore only the most obvious case and
the case requiring immediate action that is handled under this
provision.
RELEASES FROM CONFINEMENT

The State Hospital is authorized by statute to release a patient
on "probationary discharge" or to release the patient unconditionally as restored to reason. 21 This latter has the full effect of
a court order restoring the civil rights and legal capacity of the
individual. As a matter of practice, this power is seldom exercised
by the superintendent. A patient sufficiently improved to be considered a "good risk" for satisfactory readjustment in society is
released on a two-year probationary discharge. If he does not
require rehospitalization within that period he is granted automatically an administrative discharge, the effect of which is to
remove his name from the list of patients at the hospital. It has
been held that the administrative discharge is in no way effective
as a restoration to reason.22 The court order of adjudication of
insanity, in competence or deficiency remains in full force and
effect. A patient released on a probationary discharge may be
placed in the custody of family or friend, or released "on his own
Loc. cit. § 3.
s'Porter v. Pritch, 70 Conn. 235, 39 A. 169, 39 LRA 353; cases cited in
28 Am. Jur. 675 § 31.
"Loc. cit. § 18 (c).
" People v. County Court, 110 Colo. 249, 132 P, 2d 799.
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recognizance." Determination of these details lies within the discretion of the Superintendent of the Hospital.
Release from the State Hospital by order of court transferring custody to a private hospital or to a member of the family is
frequently requested. The court generally requires some showing
of the advisability of such a transfer. This is usually in the form
of a statement from the superintendent, if not actually recommending the action then at least expressing his opinion that, if released,
the patient would not be a danger to himself or others. In a contested case this question, as any other relating to confinement or
release, can be presented and determined in open court on petition
filed in behalf of the patient.
Release of an adjudicated patient from a private hospital to
the custody of family or friends may be ordered by the court upon
request supported by recommendation of the attending physician.
Although the County Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction in so-called lunacy matters appeal lies to the District Court as
in other types of cases.
RECOMMITMENTS

The procedure for rehospitalization of an adjudicated patient
depends on his status when the need arises. We shall consider
these in order.
A patient who has been released from the State Hospital on
a probationary discharge and has been out less than two years
can be returned to the hospital by the individual to whose custody
he was released or by the sheriff acting on order of court pursuant
to a change of custody order. If the patient has become acutely
ill the court may order confinement pending transportation.
If the patient has been out of the hospital longer than two
years he can be recommitted only by order of court on proper showing of the need for hospitalization.2 3 There is no requirement for
a hearing or examination by a commission. Any "showing" satisfactory to the court is sufficient. The court may require nothing
more than a doctor's statement or it may set the matter for hearing
and weigh extensive testimony.
When a patient escapes from the State Hospital, the superintendent determines whether his condition demands immediate
search and re-confinement or whether he may be safely at large.
If it appear that the patient is a potential danger to himself or
others law enforcement agencies throughout the State are notified
and every effort is employed to apprehend and return the patient
to the .hospital. If the escapee eludes detection and remains at
large for two years he acquires the automatic administrative discharge afforded to patients released under the probationary discharge. His recommitment is by court order on proper showing
of need.
A patient adjudicated and placed in the custody of family,
friend or private institution may be committed to the State Hospital
11Ibid. § 18 (c).
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under a change of custody and original order of commitment. This
applies frequently in cases of senility where adjudication has been
advisable for the protection or management of property, but
the patient's condition did not at the time warrant commitment. Later he may have become noisy, disturbing other patients
in the convalescent home, or a nursing problem requiring constant
attention, or taken to wandering aimlessly and getting lost, or in
some other way develop changes that make it now impossible or
inadvisable for him to remain at home.
A problem not infrequently encountered in Denver is the patient who has been adjudicated in one county and who later becomes
acutely ill in another county. When these appear to be the facts
and there is no immediately available means of returning the
patient to the county in which he was adjudicated, there is a
situation that requires temporary action pending issuance of the
proper order by the adjudicating court. Where possible this is
handled by telephone and the orders of recommitment or change
of custody and transportation to the State Hospital are issued to
the sheriff of the county where the patient is being held.
Occasionally in these cases there is nothing more than a suspicion that the patient was once adjudicated in another county.
If it cannot be confirmed it is necessary to proceed according to
one of the three methods outlined earlier in this paper. It is
entirely possible, in other words, for a patient to be examined by
commissions and adjudicated incompetent in more than one county
of the state. It has been suggested as a means of obviating such
duplication of action, that the State Public Health Department,
Division of Mental Hygiene, maintain a record of all adjudications
and restorations to reason in the state. The county courts and the
State Hospital would report to the Health Department all changes
in legal status relative to mental competence.
RESTORATION TO REASON

Upon recovery the adjudicated patient may be restored to
reason, thereby recovering his civil and legal rights suspended
during the illness.2 4 The patient presents to the court a letter
from a doctor stating that in his opinion the patient is well and
able to manage his own affairs, together with the petition of any
responsible person setting forth his belief that the patient has
recovered and requesting re-examination by court-appointed doctors. In Denver a letter from the City Attorney is frequently
accepted by the court in lieu of the petition. It is usually the
patient himself who appears to file for re-examination, although
it may be done for him by his attorney or friend. Upon filing of
the doctor's letter and petition and payment of $20 court costs,
the court appoints two doctors to re-examine the patient and
report their findings. A "hearing" or examination in the presence
of both doctors is not required. The patient visits each doctor
at the appointed times and later the doctors file a joint report to
4
1I
bid. § 18 (a).
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the court. The court immediately notifies the patient of the result,
and if the report is favorable, an order is issued restoring him
to reason. If he has an estate under management of a conservator,
the court further notifies the fiduciary and calls his attention to
the statute requiring final accounting and closing of the estate. 25
If the report of the doctors is unfavorable no order is issued and
the adjudication remains in full force and effect. There is no
limitation on the number of times a patient may petition for
restoration and no required interval of time between petitions.
Although the court usually appoints for re-examination the same
doctors who sat on the original commission the judge may and
frequently does, on the second and subsequent re-examinations,
appoint other doctors.
The time required to complete the restoration procedure depends almost entirely on how soon the doctors can see the patient.
In the absence of unusual circumstances, the joint report of the
doctors is filed within one week of their appointment by the court.
In cases of extreme financial hardship, the court may waive
costs. Facts supporting' request for waiver of costs should be
set forth in the petition for re-examination.
Certified copies of the order of restoration are supplied by
the court at a cost of $1.00 each. These are required by some
employers and federal agencies for re-employment or re-assignment of benefit checks.
SUGGESTED STATUTORY CHANGES

Authorities both medical and legal are in general agreement
on the need to revise terminology carried over from another era
in the diagnosis and treatment of mental illness. The word lunacy
itself survives from the day when eminent medical men advanced
their belief that the "spells" were controlled by the lunar cycle.
There may not be agreement on the extent of the revision needed;
indeed it would appear that some would introduce an entirely new
vocabulary with respect to commitment and adjudication. The
law however reflects the attitudes of the people and will not anticipate demand. The demand now is for revision commensurate
with general understanding of mental illness. It is no longer appropriate or acceptable, for instance, to hold "inquisitions or inquests
in lunacy." Words associated with criminal charges or procedures
are offensive to relatives and possibly harmful to the patient, and
should be deleted. The Bar Association, the Neuropsychiatric Society, the County Judges Association and a special committee of
the State Legislature are at work now on recommendations to be
made to the Legislature in January, 1953.
A careful reading of 1935 Colorado Statutes Annotated, Chapter 105, Section 3, reveals three methods of initiating involuntary
hospitalizationj as outlined earlier. It is believed desirable to
2CoLo. STAT. ANN., C. 105 § 16 as amended,
COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 176 § 227, § 230 (1935).

Session Laws, p. 557 (1951);
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clarify these by setting them up in subsections, and in regard to
the Hold and Treat Order, to specify a time within which the
court will determine the advisability of examination by the Commission or discharge the patient.
It is estimated that 1% of the population is mentally retarded
to the extent of requiring special care or training. There are many
features of the problem that differ from those of the mentally ill
and the senile. Early recognition by the Legislature of the special
and different nature of the problems has apparently complicated
instead of simplified the situation. The subject is vast and might
well be the topic of an entire article. Some of the special problems
that need legislative study and clarification may be enumerated.
The Homes and Training Schools at Ridge and Grand Junction
are set up as "schools" and are not bound to admit patients committed to them by order of court. Ultimate liability for the cost
of care and maintenance of the patients may fall on the county
of residence 2, rather than upon the State as in the case of patients
committed to the State Hospital. Section 8 of Ch. 105 prohibits
the commitment of persons under 16 years of age to the State
Hospital if the institutions at Ridge or Grand Junction have accommodations for such person. Long waiting lists at both institutions discourage courts and families. Patients who have become
community problems or tragic burdens in families with other
growing children are sometimes admitted ahead of others on the
list, or in the last event are committed to the State Hospital.
Although the institutions at Ridge and Grand Junction are
established as schools and make valiant efforts to function as
such, the fact remains that a pitifully small percentage of their
charges are "trainable" in any sense of the word. If the purely
custodial cases are not to be cared for in these institutions; if
these homes and schools are to admit only the "trainable" individuals, the legislature should so specify and provide other facilities for the untrainable.
A similar urgency exists with reference to senile patients who
require special nursing care and for whom there is presently no
known psychiatric treatment. A state supported home for the
senile aged would relieve the State Hospital of this large block
of purely custodial cases and permit the development of sound
treatment programs for patients suffering from mental illnesses
that may respond to such treatment.
Not more than a dozen of the 63 counties of the State have
hospital facilities for even temporary care of the mentally ill. As
indicated earlier, these patients are frequently sent in to the Colorado Psychopathic Hospital in Denver for examination and diagnosis. If the psychiatrists there believe that the patient will require long-term treatment and recommend commitment to the
State Hospital, a problem arises as to the court procedures. As
a matter of practical necessity, to insure proper care for the patient
" see
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pending commitment, to avoid delay and cost of transportation,
an arrangement has been in effect for a number of years by which
the court of the resident county transfers jurisdiction of the case
to the court of Denver County, with a request to proceed with
examination by a Denver County Commission.
The same problem arises when a Colorado resident is being
returned from another state. Authorization is given by the State
Department of Public Welfare for the other state to transport the
patient to the Colorado State Hospital in Pueblo. If there were
facilities in the patient's county of residence for hospitalization
pending examination by the commission it would seem to be desirable to place him there and proceed with a hearing in the local
county court. Since this is a practical impossibility the patient
is usually taken directly to the State Hospital in Pueblo, and the
Court of the resident county transfers jurisdiction of the case to
the Pueblo County Court. The resident county guarantees payment of court costs in the event the patient and his family are
indigent.
There is no statutory authority for this practice, and consideration by the Legislature would seem to be in order.
The hospitalization, treatment and protection of persons of
unsound mind require the cooperative efforts of the medical and
legal professions, the courts and the social agencies and the general public. The lawyer may have a duty to the court and to society
that supersedes his duty born of the attorney-client relationship.Some understanding of the medical problem, the nature of the illness, the symptoms and prognosis for treatment, the latent dangers
manifested by apparently harmless delusions, are absolute requirements for a wise decision.28 Trained as he is in adversary proceedings the lawyer concerned with a problem of mental illness must
readjust his sights and understand the full import of the court's
opinion in the Hawkyard case.2 " The lunacy hearing is there described as "a statutory proceeding by the state for the protection
of an unfortunate individual and his property." It is
not instituted for the purpose of punishing a mental incompetent or to deprive him of any property rights, but
is a proceeding to protect him from the impositions of
unscrupulous persons and to conserve his property for
his use and benefit. It is in no sense adversary ...
An understanding of this principle by practicing attorneys would
help alleviate some of the unfortunate situations in which the
patient suffers further mental stress from attending legal proceedings. Such proceedings should be held in the atmosphere of
a consulting room or hospital clinic instead of in the litigious
atmosphere of a courtroom.
27 Hawkyard
v. People, 115 Colo. 35, 169, P. 2d 176: The opinion of the
patient's attorney concerning the mental competence of his client is not barred
by the rule relating to privileged communications.
2'Psychiatry for the Lawyer, 31 Corn. L. Q. 327 (1946).
" Hawkyard v. people opp. cit.
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PROBLEMS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF
ESTATES OF MENTAL INCOMPETENTS
RICHARD P. BROWN
of the Denver Bar

This article will assume that adjudication of the incompetent
and appointment of a conservator have already been accomplished.
The discussion will be directed to the practical aspects of the
conservator's problems, with consideration of detailed legal questions left, of necessity, to the practitioner as he encounters them.
As a background to the consideration of the conservator's
problems, it is desirable to understand the source and nature of
his powers and duties. The conservator is an officer of the court
appointing him, both the court and the conservator deriving their
powers from the statutes of the jurisdiction. Being an officer of
the court, and serving in a fiduciary relationship to the ward, the
conservator owes to the court, and to his ward, the duties of the
highest fidelity, good faith, and whole-hearted service. Serving in
a statutory office, the conservator's powers are limited to those
given him by statute and proper order of court and inherent or
implied powers are few. The position of a conservator is generally
considered to be somewhat between that of an agent and that of
an administrator. A conservator acts on behalf of the ward, who
is a living person, subject to suit and retaining title to his own
property. In this light the conservator appears to be an agent,
but the mental competence of the principal and the voluntary character of the relationship, both necessary to a true agency, are
lacking. A conservator is appointed by, and subject to the jurisdiction of, a court. He is given many of the same duties, powers,
and responsibilities of the administrator of a decedent's estate,
and the laws governing his rights and duties are inextricably bound
with those relative to executors and administrators; yet the estate
of an incompetent is not a legal entity, separate and apart from
the incompetent, as in the estate of a decedent, and the transmission of the ward's property to his heirs, legatees, or devisees is
not a portion of the conservator's duties. Thus, in spite of its
resemblence to an agency and to an administration, a conservatorship is neither, but is a separate and distinct type of legal relationship.
CARE AND SUPPORT OF THE WARD AND OTHERS

Ordinarily, the order adjudicating the incompetent will commit his care and custody to an appropriate person or institution.
The primary responsibility for the personal care and custody will
rest with that person or institution. It is, however, the duty of
the conservator to be at all times cognizant of the care and treatment his ward is receiving, and to assure himself that such care
and treatment are the best obtainable consistent with the condition of the ward and the means available for that purpose. He
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should make application to the court of his appointment for orders
authorizing such expenditures as are necessary for this purpose
and if at any time a change in the custody of the ward appears
desirable, should make application to the court therefor.
Our statutes provide specifically that the court may set over
to the wife of the ward such articles of personal property as in its
discretion it deems necessary for the use of the wife and children
of the ward, and may make further allowances to the wife for
her support, and the support and education of the minor children,
such sums to be paid at such times and in such amounts as the
court may direct. This statutory authorization of allowance to
the wife and children is not considered to be exclusive. There is
a surprisingly extensive body of law to the general effect that
the assets of the ward may be used to support adult children, parents, grandchildren, and others more distantly related, where it
can be made to appear to the court that the assets of the ward
are sufficient to justify these expenditures without jeopardizing
the future care of the ward and those legally dependent upon
him, and it can be established to the satisfaction of the court that
the ward, had he remained competent, would in all probability
have supported such person or persons. This latter showing is
generally made by proving that the ward, prior to his adjudication, had in fact supported them and had by word or deed clearly
indicated an intention to continue their support.
INCOME TAXES

The ward's income tax status is not changed by the fact of
his adjudication or by the appointment of his conservator, and
the estate of the incompetent is not a separate tax-paying entity,
as is the estate of a deceased person. The ward retains the same
rights, so far as exemptions and deductions are concerned, that
he had prior to his adjudication. It is the duty of the conservator
to file both Federal and state income tax returns on behalf of the
ward in the manner and within the time required by the respective Federal and state laws. The return should be filed in the name
of the ward, or, if it is advantageous (as it probably will be) to
file a joint return, in the name of the ward and his spouse. The
Federal return is due on the same date as individual returns and
not on April 15, as is the case with fiduciary returns. Failure of
the conservator to discharge these duties properly may result in
the conservator becoming personally liable for the taxes due.
FEES

Until 1941 the fee chargeable by a conservator was limited
by Section 232 of Chapter 176 C.S.A., regardless of the period
of time through which the conservatorship might be continued.
In 1941 the legislature enacted what now appears as Section 89 (5)
of Chapter 176, which permits the court to order additional compensation to be paid to a conservator where the administration
continues for more than one year. It is customary for both cor-
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porate and individual conservators to make a charge on account
of their total fees at yearly or other intervals and, upon the conclusion of the administration, whether occasioned by the death or
restoration to reason of the ward, or by the exhaustion of the
ward's assets, to charge such additional fee as will bring the total
of the fees charged up to a reasonable compensation for the whole
of the services rendered during the period of administration of
the estate. There are no statutes regulating the fees of attorneys
in estates of mental incompetents. The minimum fee provisions
relative to estates, included in the schedule adopted by the Denver
Bar Association at its May 5, 1952 meeting, are generally considered to apply to estates of mental incompetents, and, in determining the aggregate of the fees to be charged for the whole administration of the estate, attorneys will properly take into consideration the duration of the estate, as well as the other factors
customarily considered in fixing a fee.
INVESTMENTS AND RETENTION OF ASSETS

Subject to qualifications hereinafter set out concerning the
administration of the estates of wards of the Veterans Administration, the powers and duties of conservators, with reference to
the investment of the funds of their wards, and the retention of
the assets owned by their wards, are identical with those of executors (except as their powers are enlarged by will), administrators,
and guardians, and are set forth in the chapter of the Session
Laws of 1951 adopting the "Prudent Man" rule in Colorado.' The
objective of the conservator's dealings with assets of the ward,
however, is substantially different from that of an executor or
administrator, who is mainly concerned with the preservation
of a decedent's assets through a relatively short period of administration. A conservator, in determining investment policy, must
adopt a longer range view point, as it is his duty to invest and
reinvest the assets of the ward's estate in a manner consistent
with the best interests of the ward and those dependent upon him
over a period of time, which will in all probability not end until
the death of the ward. In proper exercise of the broad discretions
granted a conservator by the "Prudent Man" rule the conservator
should give careful consideration to all pertinent facts, such as
the ward's age, physical condition, possibility of restoration of
reason, former standard of living, and the apparent requirements
of those dependent upon the ward for funds, and determine upon
an investment policy which will best permit an estate the size of
the ward's to meet the needs which those facts forecast.
ELECTION WITH REFERENCE TO WILL OF DECEASED SPOUSE

Should the spouse of the ward die, testate, during the lifetime
of the ward, the ward, as the surviving spouse, may elect to receive
one-half of the decedent's estate in lieu of the provisions made
by will, or, by failing to make such election within the allotted
six months period, become bound by the terms of the will. Section
I SESSON

LAWS OF COLORADO 1951, Chap. 297, sec. 1, p. 840.

Aug., 1952

DICTA

37 (b) of Chapter 176 C.S.A. makes it the duty of the conservator
to ascertain the relative benefits to the ward obtainable under the
will and under the statute, and to report thereon to the court, which
will make the election for the ward.
Where the will of the deceased spouse contains provisions leaving definite amounts, or properties, or a fixed fraction of the estate,
to the ward, the conservator's job (and that of the court) is simple. Where, however, the provision for the ward is a life estate,
or a beneficial interest in a testamentary trust, computation of
the value of the rights of the ward thereunder may be difficult and
the court may have a difficult problem in judgment. The problem
is further complicated in the case of a will which creates a trust
from which the trustee is authorized to use income or principal
up to the whole of the trust for the support of the ward. Thus,
if an election to take against a will would result in an outright
addition of $50,000 to the ward's estate, while an acceptance of
the provisions of the will would result in a $100,000 trust being
held for the benefit of the ward, to be expended on behalf of the
ward if and when necessary, with the unexpended balance to go
over to other beneficiaries upon the death of the ward, the court
would have to weigh the relative advantages of the two possibilities. While the court will reach individual decisions upon individaul
facts, such experience as the writer has had indicates that the
court will be, and should be, more interested in assuring the greatest security to the ward than in increasing the ward's estate, and
would elect to accept the benefits provided by the will.
.If the conservator has an adverse interest, the court is directed to appoint some other suitable person to discharge this duty.
UNIFORM VETERANS GUARDIANSHIP ACT

The Uniform Veterans Guardianship Act, as adopted by our
legislature in 1945,2 applies to the estates of mental incompetents,
as well as to those of minors, and if the ward is a beneficiary of
the Veterans Administration the provisions of the act apply to
his estate, or at least to the portion thereof which is attributable
to funds having their origin in veterans' benefits. A full dress
review of the U.V.G.A. is not appropriate here, but certain specific
provisions deserve attention. The investment provisions in Sdction 13 of that act are not superseded by the recent legislative
adoption of the so-called "Prudent Man" rule, and investment of
the funds of the ward, so far as they are attributable to V.A.
sources, is still governed by Section 13 of U.V.G.A., and by the
laws governing investments by fiduciaries at the time of the adoption of the U.V.G.A.
Compensation of the conservator, so far as derived from V.A.
funds, or the product thereof, may not exceed five per cent of the
income upon such funds for the period covered by the fee, except
in the case of extraordinary services by the conservator, in which
case an additional fee may be allowed by court order. Other pro-

' CSA,

vol. 4B, ch. 150, sec. 55 (1-21).
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visions of the act require service of notices, petitions, accountings,
and the like, upon the Veterans Administration.
It frequently occurs that a portion of the ward's estate is
derived from veterans' benefits, while the remainder is derived
from other sources. In this case the portion of the estate attributable to veterans' benefits is subject to the U.V.G.A., while the reminder is not. Because of the restrictive investment provisions
of the U.V.G.A., it is often desirable, if the estate is of reasonable
size, to separate the two portions of the estate, keeping entirely
separate accountings as to the two portions, and to administer
the portion attributable to veterans' benefits in accordance with
the U.V.G.A.; the other portion may be administered without regard to the U.V.G.A. This procedure will permit full compliance
with the U.V.G.A. as to the portion of the estate to which it applies,
without restricting the conservator's investments and adding to
his procedural burdens as to the remainder of the estate.
CONTINUATION OF THE ESTATE AFTER THE DEATH OF THE WARD

Section 89 (5) of Chapter 176 C.S.A., hereinabove referred
to in connection with fees, provides in a most sketchy manner for
the continuation of the administration of an incompetent's estate
after his death. The statute provides no guide for court, conservator, executor, or administrator, and the Supreme Court has never
been called upon to interpret the statute or supply the detail which
it lacks. The county courts, through a process of careful exploration of the matter, seem to have arrived at the uniform conclusion
that the statute means little more than that the administration of
the decedent's estate shall have the same file number as that of
the incompetent's estate, and that the papers of both shall be filed
in the same jacket.
Customary procedure, dictated in large measure by natural
caution and the indefiniteness of the statute, calls for the filing
of a petition for letters testamentary or of administration upon
the death of the incompetent, the admission to probate of the
will, if there be one, and the issuance of letters to the executor or
administrator. Notice to creditors is published as required by law
and a sepaarte inventory is filed. Meanwhile, the conservator is
publishing notice of the final settlement of his accounts, will file
his final report, and, upon the entry of an order of final settlement, will deliver the assets in his hands to the executor or administrator, and be discharged. The clerks of the county courts firm
up the separation of the two administrations by charging a new
docket fee upon the filing of the petition for letters, after the
ward's death.
There is a period of time during which the conservator, and
the executor or administrator, both hold office. During this period
the conservator is largely shorn of his powers by reason of the
death of the ward. He may, however, upon order of court, take
such steps as may be necessary to the protection of assets of the
ward, pending delivery thereof to the executor or administrator.
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The executor or administrator, during this period, is entitled to
exercise all the powers granted by law, or by the will, as to assets
under his control, and the power to act, during this period of
overlapping powers, is determined, as to any given asset, by the
power to control that asset.
PROPERTY DISPOSED OF BY THE INCOMPETENT'S WILL

An interesting problem may be presented in the case where
the ward, prior to his adjudication, has executed a will.
Let us suppose that the will leaves specified securities to A
and that, in the opinion of the conservator, retention of those securities as a part of the ward's estate is not consistent with sound
judgment. What are the conservator's duties, and what is the effect
of a sale by the conservator? It appears clear that the conservator is bound to manage the estate in the best interest of the ward
only, and should not permit his judgment to be varied by the fact
that following it may operate to adeem a legacy provided by the
ward's will. He should apply to the court for an order to sell.
The question of whether a sale under such circumstances
adeems the legacy has not been decided by our Supreme Court.
Authorities in other states are divided. Some jurisdictions, which
consider that ademption or not is a matter of testatorial intent,
hold that the ward cannot have intended an ademption, and that
none has occurred. Other jurisdictions, holding that ademption
depends not on intention but upon the bald fact of disposition of
the property before death, hold that a sale by a conservator works
an ademption of the legacy. The county court of one of the larger
counties of the state recently entered an order, without notice,
which adopted the theory that no ademption was accomplished by
such a sale, and ordered the executor to pay in cash to a legatee
a sum calculated to restore to the legatee a diminution in value
occasioned by the conservator's action in redeeming certain U.S.
Savings Bonds, which were left to the legatee, and the subsequent
purchase, with the proceeds from such redemption, of other similar
bonds which were ordered delivered to the legatee.
In the solution of all these problems the conservator should
obtain such orders of court as may be necessary to protect him in
the course which he intends to pursue and noticing in individuals
who appear to have a*potential interest in the ward's assets in the
event of his death. All expenditures made by the conservator should
be pursuant to order of court properly entered, or at least within
the framework of a general order, authorizing the conservator to
make expenditures of a given general character. The conservator
will find that many of the problems presented to him involve the
personal feelings of the individuals with whom he deals more
deeply than he suspects, and a large measure of human understanding and tact will be the greatest single factor in solving many of
his problems.
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LEGAL CAPACITY OF ADJUDGED
INCOMPETENTS
FRANCES HICKEY SCHALOW
Assistant Professor, University of Denver College of Law

The Colorado statute defines an "incompetent" as any person
who is "incapable, unassisted, to properly manage-his property-," I and provides for the appointment of a conservator when
a person has a "real or personal estate," whereupon he is to be
committed to the "care of some
person or institution" as an incom2
petent as previously defined.
Shapter v. Pillar3 was decided under the statute of 1893, but
the definition of an incompetent therein was substantially the
same as the above. There, the court said:
The main object of the statute is the protection of
the property of those mentally afflicted; inquiry must
be made as to the extent of such mental infirmity. If
it causes the person to be "unable to act intelligently
with respect to his business affairs" or prevents him from
acting in a "provident manner in the management of his
property interests, the statute is satisfied." However,
although the mind may be unsound, "if there be capacity
to manage, as the result of consecutive reasoning, although the management might not be such as intellectual
vigor and skill might approve," the person doesn't come
within the purview of the statute.
In a later case, 4 the court adopted substantially the same
definition, saying the legal test of insanity is whether the person
is "incapable of understanding and appreciating the extent and
effect of business transactions in which he is engaged." This is
in accord with the general rule on capacity to contract and execute
legal instruments.
THE CAPACITY TO CONTRACT

1935 C.S.A., Ch. 105, sec. 20, provides:
All contracts, agreements, and credits with or to any
such lunatic, shall be absolutely void as against such persons, his or her heirs, or personal representatives; but
persons making such contracts or agreements with any
such lunatic shall be bound thereby at the election of his
or her conservators.
The statute seems to be too clear to admit comment, and there
are no Colorado cases interpreting it.
THE CAPACITY TO MAKE A WILL

The Colorado court has said that contractual capacity and
testamentary capacity are the same,5 and further, that an adjudi'COLO.
STAT. ANN., C. 105, § 1 (1935).
2
Ibid., § 9.
'28 Colo. 209, 63 P. 302 (1900).
'Hanks v. McNeil Corp., 114 Colo. 578, 168 P. 2d 256 (1946).
5Ibid.
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cation of incompetency does not operate as "a conclusive bar to
the making of a valid will" by the decedent so long as it remains
in effect, since the "effect of a guardianship may be overcome
by proof that the testator was mentally competent at the time
the will was executed." 6
THE CAPACITY TO COMMIT A TORT

There are no Colorado cases on this question. However, the
general rule appears to be that an insane person is liable for his
own torts, 7 unless the particular tort involves a specific intention
which he is incapable of entertaining.8 Further, the liability is
not affected by the fact that the defendant was under guardianship at the time.9 However, compensatory damages only can be
recovered against him. 10
THE CAPACITY TO MARRY

Williams v. Williams 11held that a marriage "to a lunatic" is
"absolutely void." A later case 12 applied the same rule.
THE CAPACITY TO BRING AN ACTION FOR DIVORCE

The one Colorado case with dictum on the subject 13 indicates
that an insane person cannot bring an action for divorce, since
such an action is based on a "voluntary decision" to terminate
the marriage, which decision "an incompetent person cannot
make." The court states the general rule as being that "an insane
person has a legal capacity to sue, . . . provided he has not been
divested of the power to act for himself by having been adjudicated
incompetent and having been placed under guardianship." 14 However, the particular action was not for divorce, but rather concerned the right of a conservator to bring an action to annul the
marriage of his ward on the ground of the latter's insanity. This,
it was held, the conservator could do under the decision in Williams
v. Williams, supra.
'Martin v. Reid, 106 Colo. 69, 101 P. 2d 25 (1940).
'Roberts v. Hayes, 284 Ill. App. 275, 1 N. E. 2d 711 (1936); Shedrick v.
Lathrop, 106 Vt. 311, 172 A. 630 (1934).
'Chaddock v. Chaddock, 130 Misc. 900, 226 N. Y. S. 152 (1927); Sweeney
v. Carter, 24 Tenn. App. 6, 137 S. W. 2d 892 (1939).
9Morain v. Devlin, 132 Mass. 87, 42 Am. R. 423 (1882).
lOUllrich. v. N. Y. Press Co., 23 Misc. 168, 50 N. Y. S. 788 (1898), McIntyre
v. Sholty, 121 Ill.660, 13 N. E. 239 (1887).
1 83 Colo. 180, 263 P. 725 (1927).
12 Cox v. Armstrong, 122 Colo. 227, 221 P. 2d 371 (1950).
Is Ibid.
"See, also: COLO. RULES OF CIV. PRO(!., 17C(c) providing that the appointed
representative of an incompetent may sue on behalf of the latter; that if the
representative fails to act, the incompetent may sue by his next friend or
guardian ad litem, and further, that the Court shall appoint a representative
for an incompetent not otherwise represented in an action.
See, also: 1935 C.S.A. Ch. 176, see. 136, providing that conservators shall
be allowed to prosecute actions on behalf of their wards.
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COMMITMENT OF MISDEMEANANTS TO THE
COLORADO STATE REFORMATORY
FRANK A. WACHOB
of the Denver Bar and First Assistant Attorney General

That part of Sec. 512, Ch. 48, 1935 C. S. A., here pertinent,
provides as follows:
Courts having criminal jurisdiction in Colorado shall
sentence to the state reformatory all male persons, and
none other, duly convicted before them of felony for the
first time, who slhall at the time of sentence be of full
age of sixteen (16) years and not more than twenty-one
(21) years of age; -* * * and also all male persons between said ages, duly convicted before them of a misdemeanor, where the imprisonment for the offense charged
shall not be less than ninety days; * * *" (Italics supplied.)
Sec. 513, Ch. 48, 1935 C. S. A., provides as follows:
Any person who shall be convicted of an offense
punishable by imprisonment in the state reformatory,
and who, upon such conviction, shall be sentenced to imprisonment therein, shall be imprisoned according to this
section and the other sections codified from the act of
1889, and not otherwise; and the. courts of this state imposing such sentence shall not fix or limit the duration
thereof; the term of such imprisonment of any persons
so convicted and sentenced shall be terminated by the
board of penitentiary commissioners and warden, as authorized by this section and other sections codified from
the act of 1889; but such imprisonment shall not, in any
event exceed the maximum term provided for which the
prisoner was convicted and sentenced. (Italics supplied.)
Sec. 514, Ch. 48, 1935 C. S. A., provides as follows:
If, through oversight or otherwise, any person be
sentenced to imprisonment in the said state reformatory
for a definite period of time, said sentence shall not for
that reason be void, but the person so sentenced shall be
entitled to the benefit and subject to the liabilities of this
section and other sections codified from the act of 1889,
in the same manner, and to the same extent as if the
sentence had been in the terms required by the last preceding section, and in such case the commissioners shall
deliver to said offender a copy of this act, with written
information of his relation to the commissioners.
Sec. 1, Art. VI, Colo. Const., provides as follows:
The judicial power of the state as to all matters of
law and equity, except as in the constitution otherwise
provided, shall be vested in the supreme court, district
courts, county courts, and such other courts as may be
provided by law. In counties and cities and counties hav-
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ing a population exceeding 100,000, exclusive original
jurisdiction in cases involving minors and persons whose
offenses concern minors may be vested in a separate court
now or hereafter established by law.
The courts having original criminal jurisdiction and the limitations thereof are as follows:
District Courts: The district court shall have original jurisdiction of all cases both at law and in equity,
* * *. (Sec. 11, Art. VI, Colo. Const.)
County Courts: Original jurisdiction is hereby conferred upon the county courts in each of the several
counties of this state, in cases of misdemeanor, and such
courts shall hereafter be empowered to try such cases
upon information by the district attorney of the district
in which such counties are situated. (Sec. 170, Ch. 46,
1935 C. S. A.) (Italics supplied.)
Justice of the Peace Courts: Original jurisdiction is
hereby conferred in all cases of misdemeanor upon any
justice of the peace of the county in which the offense
is committed; such jurisdiction to be concurrent with
the jurisdiction of the county court and district court as
provided by law; * * *. (Sec. 158, Ch. 96, 1935 C.
S. A.) (Italics supplied.)
Juvenile Court: The juvenile court is not a constitutional court, it is created by statute and possesses only
such powers as are properly conferred upon it by law.
(Abbott v. People, 91 Colo. 510.)
Therefore, we shall consider the juvenile court apart from
the district, county and justice courts.
I.
The District Court is a court of general jurisdiction, and, as
such, has jurisdiction over both felonies and misdemeanors. Therefore, there is no argument as to the applicability of Sec. 512, Ch.
48, 1935 C. S. A., to this court.
The jurisdiction of the County and Justice Courts is limited
to misdemeanors. This eliminates them from the first part of
Sec. 512, supra, since that portion of the said Sec. 512 is only
applicable to persons "convicted before them of felony," but gives
them jurisdiction under that part of the statute which reads as
follows:
All male persons between said ages, duly convicted
before them of a misdemeanor where the imprisonment
for the offense charged shall not be less than ninety days.
Sec. 513, supra, provides that:
" * * * the courts of this state imposing such sentence shall not fix or limit the duration thereof.
Sec. 514, supra, provides that:
If, through oversight or otherwise any person be
sentenced to imprisonment in the said state reformatory
for a definite period of time, said sentence shall not for
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that reason be void, but the person so sentenced shall be
entitled to the benefit and subject to the liabilities * * *
in the same manner, and to the same extent as if the
sentence had been in the terms required by the last preceding section, * * *
In my opinion, Sec. 512 must be read with said two sections
and, when so read, it is then apparent that the sentencing judge
is not the one that can fulfill the requirement of said Sec. 512,
to-wit: "where the imprisonment for the offense charged shall
not be less than ninety days," but that this phraseology must relate
to the statute which fixes the term of imprisonment for the misdemeanor.
For example-Under authority of Sec. 512, supra, John Doe
was convicted of the crime of petit larceny and sentenced by the
justice court to serve five (5) months in the state reformatory.
Under authority of Sec. 21, Ch. 16, 1935 C. S. A., Richard
Roe was convicted of joy riding, first offense, and sentenced by
the justice court to serve an indeterminate sentence in the state
reformatory.
In Van Kleeck v. Ramer, 62 Colo. 4, 20, our court quotes with
approval from Town of South Ottawa v. Perkins, 94 U. S. 267, 24
L. Ed. 154, as follows:
"That which purports to be a law of a State is a
law, or it is not a law, according as the truth of the fact
may be, and not according to the shifting circumstances
of parties * * * and whether it be a law, or not a law,
is a judicial question, to be settled and determined by the
courts and judges."
In People v. Leddy, 53 Colo. 109, 111, our court said:
As every enrolled bill, signed by the proper officers
and lodged with the secretary of state, however, repugnant to the constitution, has the appearance, semblance
and force of law, the general rule is, that public officials
shall obey its terms until some one, whose rights it invades, complains, and calls in the aid of the judicial power
to pronounce it void as to him, his property or his rights.
In view of these decisions, the executive department would
take no action in the said two cases until someone whose rights
were involved challenged the statute and the jurisdiction of the
courts thereunder. These challenges came by way of writs of
habeas corpus issued in the above test cases, and were heard in
the district court together as cases numbered A-40602 and A-40606.
Petit larceny is defined by Sec. 85, Ch. 48, 1935 C. S. A., as
amended by Ch. 146, S. L. '51, insofar as here pertinent, as follows:
* * * where the aggregate value of the things stolen
or removed does not exceed the value of fifty dollars
($50.00) shall be punished * * * or by imprisonment
at hard labor for a term not exceeding six months, or by
both such fine and imprisonment. Stealing from the person of another shall, upon conviction, be punished by im-
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prisonment in the penitentiary for a term of not less than
one year nor more than ten years.
(a) The first crime defined in the statute is petit larceny and
is a misdemeanor.
(b) The second is larceny from the person, and because of
its sentence is denominated a felony by Sec. 4, Art. XVIII, Colo.
Const.
Under the misdemeanor, the sentencing court, whether district, county or justice court, must prescribe an indeterminate
sentence under Sec. 513, supra, the maximum of which shall not
"exceed six months." If the said court prescribes a fixed sentence,
such as ninety days; three months; four months; five months; or
six months, such fixed sentence fails under Sec. 514, supra, and
the sentence then becomes indeterminate under said Sec. 513. In
other words, the very part of the sentence which was fixed by
the court to meet the conditions of said Sec. 512, to-wit: "imprisonment for the offense charged shall not be less than ninety days,"
has failed and can never meet the requirements of the statute in
that respect.
(b) The felony charge---of larceny from the person-is cognizable by the district court, but not by the county or justice
courts, because their jurisdiction is limited to misdemeanors, supra.
If the male felon is a first offender and comes within the other
provisions of the said Sec. 512, then the district court shall or
may sentence to the state reformatory, depending upon the age
of such male felon.
The district court found:
1. That the said imprisonment, restraint and holding
of the said John Doe, as aforesaid, was and is illegal and
not warranted in law for the following reasons:
(a) That the said mittimus is void on its face, because it provides for two places of confinement, to-wit,
the state reformatory at Buena Vista and the common
jail of the City and County of Denver;
(b) That the imprisonment for the offense of petit
larceny, as provided by Sec. 1, Ch. 146, Colo. S. L. 1951,
does not meet the requirements of Sec. 512, Ch. 48, 1935
C. S. A., in that the imprisonment for petit larceny therein
provided is " by imprisonment at hard labor for a term
not exceeding six months," and not for a term of "not
less than ninety days," as provided in said Sec. 512;
(c) That Sec. 513, Ch. 48, 1935 C. S. A., requires
that the courts of this state imposing such sentences (i.e.,
to the state reformatory), shall not fix or limit the duration thereof, and that, by sentencing the petitioner "to
5 months in the State Reformatory," the court did not
thereby supply to itself jurisdiction to sentence the petitioner to the state reformatory at Buena Vista for petit
larceny.
2. That the petitioner should be discharged from the
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custody of the warden of the Colorado State Reformatory
at Buena Vista, Colorado, and the mittimus or order of
commitment be quashed and held for naught.
3. That that portion of Sec. 512, Ch. 48, 1935 C. S.
A., which reads: "and also, all male persons between said
ages, duly convicted before them of a misdemeanor, where
the imprisonment for the offense charged shall not be
less than ninety days," is unconstitutional and in violation of Sec. 1, Art. VIII, and Sec. 4, Art. XVIII, Colo.
Const.
And entered its judgment of discharge upon the writ accordingly.
In the case of Richard Roe, the district court found:
1. That said restraint and imprisonment at the said
state reformatory is illegal and without warrant in law,
for the following reasons, to-wit:
(a) That said mittimus or order of commitment is
void upon its face, inasmuch as it there appears that
the court has ordered two places of confinement at the
same time, to-wit, state reformatory at Buena Vista, Colorado, and the common jail of the City and County of
Denver;
(b) That Sec. 21, Ch. 16, '35 C. S. A., provides that:
"Any person or persons who shall without authority of
the owner or his duly authorized and accredited agent,
wilfully, wantonly, or maliciously take possession of, or
drive, or propel, or take away, or attempt to take possession of, drive, propel, or take away an automobile, the
property of another, for the purpose of temporarily depriving the owner thereof of said automobile, or of the
use of the same, or for the purpose of temporarily appropriating the same to his own use, or of temporarily making use of the same, or who shall knowingly aid, abet or
assist another in so doing, shall, upon first conviction,
be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished
by imprisonment of not less than thirty days nor more
than twelve months in the county jail of the county where
such conviction is had." (Italics supplied.)
And that the said justice court was limited by said statute to the sentencing of the said Ralph Martin Gonzales
to a term in the county jail of the City and County of
Denver for not less than 30 days nor more than 12
months;
2. That Secs. 512, 513 and 514, Ch. 48, '35 C. S. A.,
have no application to the instant case;
3. That the petitioner should be discharged from the
said Colorado State Reformatory, and that the said mittimus or order of commitment should be quashed and
held for naught.
And entered its judgment of discharge upon the writ accordingly.
As a result of these two decisions, the Executive Department has
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a court determination of the law and can now proceed accordingly.
II.
Commitments from a juvenile court pose a far more difficult
problem by reason of the court's peculiar status.
In the case of Abbott v. People, 91 Colo. 510, our Supreme
Court, quoting from Colias v. People, 60 Colo. 230, said:
The jurisdiction of the court extends only to cases
in which the disposition, custody or control of a minor or
other person is involved under certain acts concerning
minors, parents, etc. Criminal cases in the juvenile court
must, therefore, be such only as are incidental to cases
arising under the acts named unless a larger jurisdiction is conferred by some other part of the act, and the
opinion held that no such larger jurisdiction was conferred (p. 512).
"Juvenile courts are not criminal courts. Their function is not to try criminal charges and punish for criminal
offenses. It is only upon the theory that they are not
criminal courts that their establishment, and that their
methods of procedure, can be authorized as constitutional" (Citations) (p. 515).
Sec. 199, Ch. 46, 1935 C. S. A., establishes juvenile courts as
follows:
In each county, and in each municipality known and
designated as a city and county, in this state, in which
there is a population of one hundred thousand or more
inhabitants, there is hereby created and established a
court of record, to be known as the juvenile court of
such county, or city and county.
Sec. 216 of said Ch. 46 provides, among other things, that:
Neither the county court, nor the judge thereof, in
any county, city and county, as the same may be, wherein
a juvenile court is created and established under the
provisions of this article, shall hereafter exercise any
jurisdiction in which the disposition, custody or control
of any child or minor, or any other person, may be involved under the acts concerning delinquent, dependent
or neglected children, or any other acts or statutes or
law of this state concerning dependent, delinquent or
neglected children, or which may in any manner concern
or relate to the person, liberty, protection, correction,
* morality, control, adoption or disposition of any infant,
child or minor, * * *
In counties where the is no juvenile court, Sec. 177 of said
Ch. 46, provides that:
Original jurisdiction is hereby conferred upon the
county courts in each of the several counties of this state
in all criminal cases where at the time of the filing of
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the information the accused shall be a minor; and such
courts shall hereafter be empowered to try such cases
upon information filed by the district attorney of the
judicial district in which such counties are situated.
Sec. 53, Ch. 33, supra, among other things, provides:
In case such child has passed the age of sixteen years and
its delinquency is chronic or repeated, or would under
the laws of this state constitute a felony, the court may,
in its discretion, where any such commitment is necessary, commit such child to any state institution under
the same terms and conditions as it might have been committed if prosecuted and convicted in the criminal court
for a felony; * * *
This poses the following problems:
1. Does this section give the juvenile courts and the county
courts, acting in the capacity of juvenile courts, concurrent jurisdiction with the district courts over all criminal matters, including
felonies?
2. Can a county court, as such, sentence a male person, over
the age of 16 years, to the state reformatory, when the misdemeanor bears imprisonment for "not less than ninety days," and
at the same time, sitting as a juvenile court, sentence a child
(male or female), which is past the age of sixteen "to any state
institution (this would include the penitentiary) under the same
terms and conditions as it might have been committed if prosecuted and convicted in the criminal court for a felony"?
Said Sec. 53 is a part of the 1923 act and was in effect when
our Supreme Court decided the case of People v. Morley, 77 Colo.
25. In reviewing the juvenile court act, the court said (p. 27)
The Constitution, article VI, section 1, originally
read: "The judicial power of the state, as to matters of
law and equity, except as in the Constitution otherwise
provided, shall be vested in a supreme court, district
courts, county courts, justices of the peace, and such other
courts as may be provided by law." R. S. 1908.
In 1912 the following was added: "In counties and
cities and counties having a population exceeding 100,000,
exclusive original jurisdiction in cases involving minors
and persons whose offenses concern minors may be vested
in a separate court now or hereafter established by law."
Section 11 of said article is as follows: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all causes
both at law and in equity, and such appellate jurisdiction as may be conferred by law." * * *
No attempt was made by legislation to grant the exclusive jurisdiction permitted by the amendment of section 1, until 1923. Chapters 75 and 78 of the Session
Laws of that year contain the following: "The words
'delinquent child' shall include any child eighteen years
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of age or under such age who violates any law of this
state. * * *" S. L. 1923, c. 75, p. 197.
The relator is charged with violation of a law of this
state, therefore, if guilty, he is delinquent. If his delinquency is denied, the juvenile court may try the issue.
People v. Juvenile Court, supra.
"Any child committing any of the acts herein mentioned may be proceeded against in the courts of record
of this state having jurisdiction over juveniles in the
manner provided for in this act: * * *" S. L. 1923,
c. 75, p. 198.
The relator is charged with the commission of one
of "the acts herein mentioned" and therefore may be
prosecuted in a court of record having jurisdiction over
juveniles, i.e., the juvenile court.
Juvenile courts "shall have coordinate jurisdiction
with the district and county courts of this state in any
criminal case of the people against or concerning any
person under the age of twenty-one years, * * * and
in proceedings concerning the annulment of marriages,
where either of the parties thereto are under the age of
twenty-one years at the time of filing such case in such
court, and in cases under the Redemption of Offenders
Act, being Chapter 199, page 478, Session Laws of 1909.
Such courts shall also, in their respective counties, have
exclusive jurisdiction, subject to appeals and writs of
error as provided by law, in all cases concerning neglected, dependent or delinquent children or persons who
cause, encourage or contribute thereto, and in all cases
concerning the adoption, custody or disposition of children and the care and protection of their persons from
neglect, cruelty, abuse and proceedings concerning feebleminded children; provided that in all cases of feebleminded children under the age of twenty-one years the
proceedings in such courts shall be as provided in Chapter 118 of the Session Laws of 1915, page 336 thereof,
*
* *", S. L. 1923, c. 78, p. 209.
*

*

*

*

*

There are two possible interpretations which may
be given to these statutes, neither of which is entirely
satisfactory:
1. One is that the juvenile and district courts have
coordinate jurisdiction in cases of persons nineteen to
twenty-one years of age, and the juvenile court exclusive
jurisdiction of persons eighteen or under. If, however,
this is what the legislature meant, it is inexplicable that
they did not say so in plain terms. It is almost inconceivable that the legislature should, under an apparent
grant to one court of jurisdiction over a certain subject
coordinate with another, deprive that other of 19/21 of

302

DICTA

Aug., 1952

the jurisdiction which it had before. Moreover by this
construction section 2 is inconsistent with itself, because
it gives coordinate jurisdiction as to all under 21 and
"also * * * exclusive jurisdiction" as to all eighteen or
under.
2. The second meaning is that the jurisdiction is
coordinate as to criminal cases of the people against or
concerning any minor, and exclusive as to other matters
concerning those eighteen or under. This makes the section consistent with itself, and, while it seems inconsistent with the definition of delinquent and dependent children in chapter 75, it is not necessarily so. That chapter,
except by the quotation- from page 198, which we notice
below, does not refer to the jurisdiction of any court. It
defines a delinquent as one who has broken the law, but
it says nothing about criminal cases or cases by the people against him. This second interpretation, therefore,
is the one to be preferred, and is not at variance with
our construction of this section in People v. Juvenile
Court, supra.
There are additional reasons for this preference, although, when taken alone, they are perhaps inconclusive.
The constitutional jurisdiction of the district court is
unlimited. It should not be limited without circumspection, and no statute should be held to limit it unless
it says so plainly, which this statute does not. Then too
the above quoted provision of c. 75, "Any child * * *
may be proceeded against in the courts of record in this
state having jurisdiction over juveniles," should read
"must" for "may" to approach consistency with the interpretation first above stated, but, reading "may" more
nearly agrees with the second construction. These two
acts were passed by one legislature and approved on the
same day and should be made to agree if possible.
In cases where the jurisdiction of the subject matter
is concurrent, that court which first acquires jurisdiction over the case controls it. 15 C. J. 1134, sec. 583.
It follows, then, that the district court has jurisdiction. We are less concerned about the results of this
judgment because it is easy for the legislature to amend
the statutes to make them say plainly what it wishes.
In the case of Abbott v. People, 91 Colo. 510, our Supreme
Court said (p. 512) :
"It will be observed that the expressed purpose of
the liberal construction prescribed is that the jurisdiction of the court, * * * shall be concurrent with the
District Court in specified criminal cases. That is to say,
in any criminal case arising incidentally in causes in
which the Juvenile Court has jurisdiction under said
section two that court has concurrent jurisdiction with
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the District Court. General jurisdiction in cases of criminal offenses against minors could hardly be given in a
section which merely prescribes a liberal construction of
a statute conferring jurisdiction in a specified class of
cases." And the court further said:
"This repetition of the language of section two, defining the court's jurisdiction, in the same section in which
is found the requirement for a liberal construction, is conclusive that no general jurisdiction of criminal cases
was intended. This conclusion finds support in other parts
of the act, which emphasizes the purpose of the law as
being to provide for the protection and care of neglected
or delinquent children, as the very name of the court
indicates. * * * Section 18 authorizes the calling in of
county judges in case of the absence, sickness, or disability of the judge of the Juvenile Court, and if the
Juvenile Court has the jurisdiction for which the state
contends, judges of the County Courts may sit in the trial
of all criminal cases, where the offense is committed
against a minor.
"In view of the fact that judges of the County Court
are not required to be, and frequently are not members
of the bar, or learned in the law, it is highly improbable
that the legislature intended by this act to make it possible for county judges to sit in cases which they are, in
many instances, wholly unqualified to try."
The legislature has made no subsequent changes to these sections; therefore, we must assume that this interpretation by the
Supreme Court stands approved. When read in that light, a
juvenile court, or a county court sitting as a juvenile court, can
sentence a child, past the age of. sixteen who is a chronic or repeated delinquent, to a state institution for misdemeanants, to-wit,
Industrial School for Boys, Sec. 10, Ch. 105, '35 C. S. A.; Industrial School for Girls, Sec. 20, Ch. 105, '35 C. S. A.; Boys Reformatory, Sec. 61, Ch. 105, '35 C. S. A.; Girls Reformatories,
Sec. 65, Ch. 105, '35 C. S. A.
That all male persons sentenced to the state reformatory by
such juvenile court must bear an indeterminate sentence, in view
of the requirement of Sec. 513, Ch. 48, supra; that "the courts of
this state imposing such sentence shall not fix or limit the duration thereof; * * * "
That if the juvenile court, or the county court sitting as a
juvenile court, does, "through oversight or otherwise," fix a definite sentence, it is to be disregarded under Sec. 514, Ch. 48, supra,
and treated as an indeterminate sentence under said Sec. 513,
supra.
The phraseology in said Sec. 53, Ch. 33, supra, "or would
under the laws of this state constitute a felony, the court may
in its discretion, where any such commitment is necessary commit
such child to any state institution under the same terms and con-
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ditions as it might have been committed if prosecuted and convicted in the criminal court for a felony; * * *" then fits into
the general scheme of said Sec. 513, supra. The sentence is indeterminate in character, and the Parole Board, or the Parole Board
plus the warden, can proceed under said Sec. 513, supra, as in
other reformatory cases.
It must be apparent by this time that the juvenile court needs
some new statutes to work with if its work is to be effective. Also,
some statutory line of demarcation as to when a county court is
sitting as a court with criminal juridiction over misdemeanors,
and when. it is sitting as a juvenile court with jurisdiction only
over chronic or repeated acts of delinquency, although such repeated acts may consist of larceny, burglary or rape. As the situation now exists, confusion has been added to chaos.

CORRECTION
The American Bar Association and other groups urge the
adoption of an amendment to the United States Constitution which
would read as follows:
A provision of a treaty which conflicts with any provision of this Constitution shall not be of any force or
effect. A treaty shall become effective as internal law in
the United States only through legislation by Congress
which it could enact under its delegated powers in the
absence of such treaty.
The treaty making power and certain related problems were discussed in the June, 1952, issue of Dicta, Volume XXIX, Number 6.
On page 197 of that issue your editor noted that the action taken
by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association in
favoring such a constitutional amendment was not unanimous
and was opposed by the Standing Committee on Peace and Law
through United Nations. This was error and the Section of International and Comparative Law was meant. The resolution was
hotly debated in the House of Delegates. The Section of International Law did not consider a constitutional amendment either
necessary or desirable. The Committee on Peace and Law, having
drafted the proposed amendment, strongly supported it and the
resolution was carried by a very large majority.

CORPORATION NEEDS LAWYER
A major oil company in Wyoming is seeking an attorney (3038 years of age) having from five to ten years experience in general practice. Experience in oil and gas law is desirable but not
required. Address inquiries to the Colorado Bar Association, 702
Midland Savings Building, Denver, Colorado, stating salary desired,
educational background and experience and references. All inquiries will be kept strictly confidential.
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MISPLACED INMATES OF THE STATE HOME
AND TRAINING SCHOOL
A. C. SUDAN, M. D.,
Superintendent

[The following article is the condensation of an address given
by Dr. Sudan before a meeting of the County Judges Association
of Colorado. At the same meeting an address was delivered by
Assistant Attorney General Frank A. Wachob which was published
in the January, 1952 issue of Dicta, Volume XXIX, Number 1, at
page 27 under the title "Liability of Counties for Support of Inmates in State Institutions." It is suggested that Dr. Sudan's and
Mr. Wachob's articles be read together. Editor.]
I should like to discuss in this article some misconceptions of
a large segment of our State population regarding inmates of the
State Homes and Training Schools, at both Ridge and Grand
Junction and some of our problems as administrators of these
institutions.
First, I think it is unfortunate that many good citizens of
Colorado, and also members of the Legislature have had erroneous
conceptions concerning our patients in both schools. These are
that the inmates of these Homes, for the most part, have a fixed
mentality which can in no way be improved, and that custodial care,
simple shelter, simple food and a place to concentrate these burdens
of unfortunate families is all that is required. That this theme was
not in the minds of legislators some 39 years ago is evidenced by
the fact that the parent institution at Ridge was built on school
land, and the statute which established the institution reads: "The
essential object of said school and home shall be mental, moral,
physical education and training of feeble-minded children." Also,
in outlining the qualifications of the Superintendent, this Statute
provides that "He shall be competent to direct the medical, hygiene, educational, and industrial interests of the State Home and
Training School".
When this school opened for patient reception in 1912, some
23 boys and 23 girls were organized into various classes of kindergarten, elementary, English, manual, and industrial endeavors.
In 1920, because of lack of sufficient capacity at Ridge, the Legislature established the present school at Grand Junction on the
site of the School for Indian Boys, which the Federal Government had abandoned in 1916 and turned over to the State, and
three of these old Indian School buildings are still in use. This
addition to Ridge opened with three academic teachers and gradually declined in this department until, in 1935, there were none.
Throughout these years, Ridge did not at any time have more
than two academic teachers.
Following recent legislative interest, and an opinion of our
Attorney General, these Institutions have again been proclaimed
educational in function and intent, and therefore, their academic
activities now fall under the jurisdiction of the Department of
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Education, while the institutions otherwise are under the direction of the Board of State Public Institutions. Hence it may be
stated that we are almost back where we started from many
years ago, except for an increased institutional population, an
expanded physical plant, and a renewed determination to accept
our responsibility to carry out the fundamental object of this institution-the education of the mentally defective child.
OBJECT Is ACADEMIC TRAINING

But again, back to the unfortunate misconception of many
of our citizens regarding the status of our pupils-the feeling
that, since it is impossible for any institution to return a mentally defective child to its parents or the community a perfectly
normal individual, there is little sense in trying to do anything
for it at all. Those of us who have accepted the challenge harbor
the feeling that the State of Colorado owes an education to every
child within its boundaries to the full capacity of the child for
accepting or assimilating knowledge. Even if a child is decidedly
defective mentally he should have an opportunity, at least equal
to that of the normal child, to develop this remnant of mental
ability. Who is there to say that this effort in behalf of the mentally defective child is not due its parents in equal proportion to
the efforts made in behalf of the normal child? Certainly, many
of these children cannot be taken into the Public Schools. Those
who are capable of assimilating academic education, we propose
to give every opportunity to although we are not at all inclined
to the belief that we will produce college professors.
We have at present four academic teachers at Ridge and three
at Grand junction, where we could profitably use several more.
The enthusiasm these inmates show for school work, and the extent of progress made by many is surprising. Our concept of
education, however, does not begin or end in the academic sphere.
We feel that every effort in the institution must be educational
and that it is educational to train a child in bowel habits. The
mother of any normal child recalls full well this aspect of her
child's education, and the many trying hours spent at it. We believe that it is education and a worthwhile accomplishment to
teach a child, six to eleven years of age, to feed himself or herself
perhaps for the first time in its life. We have experienced this
accomplishment in some twenty of our inmates who, for their
entire institutional existence, had been fed by another inmate or
attendant and who, reacting like birds in a nest, had simply
opened their mouths for food that was spooned in as by a parent
bird. We believe it is education to train a child in personal cleanliness and clean eating habits, even if it is only to teach the child
to avoid eating its own feces or besmearing itself with human
excreta.
These are but a few of our problems with the very low grade
mental defectives. It is not to this type of patient alone that we
need to direct educational effort and an equal effort must be
directed to the very young patient from three weeks, six months,
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or a year of age. We need constantly to remind ourselves of what
might be the uninhibited reactions of a normal child in an abnormal environment such as these children experience. A great measure of success in this type of education has been demonstrated in
every area of our institution. In the kitchen and all other areas,
inmates have been trained as efficient, effective personnel and
only a few trained attendants are necessary as guides. In our
laundry, five to seven tons of work including finished laundry
for attendants, is done every week. Dairy work, farming, cleaning, bed making, diaper changing for seventy or eighty helpless
children, four to six times each, daily, is done mainly by trained
inmates. In every avenue of effort required for a well functioning
institution, the inmate contributes. Education is the answer to
harmonious community living and in every area, with rare exception, we view harmonious relations, and evident happiness.
So much for a background. I return to the problems confronting those of us who are charged with the responsibilities of
administration.
PHYSICAL DEFECTIVES
In our institution at Grand Junction, we have no fewer than
10 blind children some of whom have been in the institution since
early childhood. How could a determination have been made of
mental defect in such a handicapped child? Even at this date,
who can accurately say that such a child is mentally defective?
Placed in an environment such as this child has been, in a bed
alongside of a mute person, surrounded by others with like defect,
attended by an inmate, who is gentle, but who seldom says a
word, how could mental growth be obtained? The child is, perhaps,
fed bird-fashion, and returned to bed and its own devises to
develop whatever mannerism that may gratify some primitive
whim. Certainly, we do not have adequately trained personnel
nor proper equipment to deal with problems of this scope. The
State does have an institution for educating the blind.
In another area, we have a deaf child and mutes, not one but
I believe six at Grand Junction. These are all excellent workers,
pleasant of countenance, and of inviting personality but unable
to read or write. Information comes to them only through observation of people or objects, yet, they comprehend even crude attempts
at direction by signs or motions and are very eager to carry out
any task assigned them by such direction. They respond with
extreme eagerness in doing whatever tasks are assigned and
return anxious to know whether the tasks were properly done.
Does this indicate mental defect? Hardly! Retardation because
of tremendous handicap, yes. One shamefully feels how unfortunate this individual was in not having had the advantage of
proper schooling in an institution adequately equipped to modify
this child's handicap in life. Ironically enough, our state also provides a school for this purpose.
We also have the person with an active psychosis. Mingling
in abnormal areas with defective, but not insane persons can
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mean little but complete mental deterioration for such a person.
Time for a possible cure in a proper institution with trained attendants and an attuned environment and competent psychiatric
therapy is denied him. Consider the problem of this person's
highly agitated mind which, by fear or by delusions, may seek
escape or perpetrate vengeance on an innocent helpless spastic
person in the same ward.
THE INCORRIGIBLE CHILD

We also have the "problem child," not a mental defective,
but one with mental retardation. He or she may be the child of
a migratory worker who is never long in any area and whose child,
or children, do not have the advantage of a permanent school or environment. The father dies, or the parents separate, and the
child who is trying to find his place in life becomes a problem to
the mother, and to the community. The Welfare workers become
involved and not infrequently the child is branded a mental defective and finds his way to our institutions rather than to a school
properly equipped to handle this problem.
Since our homes and training schools are not equipped or
staffed as correctional or penal institutions, it is hardly justice
to charge us with the responsibility of any child or patient other
than a mental defective. In justice to many parents of mentally
defective children who have applied for admission but who cannot be admitted for want of available space, our misfits should
be distributed to proper areas and, with the cooperation of our
County Courts, this should not entail too great a difficulty.
When a mentally deficient inmate become a definite psychopath it would be of great aid, and we feel only proper, for the
County Judge having jurisdiction, to transfer custody of this
patient from our institution to the State Hospital or the Colorado
Psychopathic Hospital for study or care.
Concerning applications for admission of new patients to the
State Home and Training School we know that some believe that
there is discrimination or that capricious attitudes eminate from
the administrators of these institutions. We are at all times ready
to admit every patient for whom we have a space. In many areas,
we are now extremely overcrowded. One of these areas is that
for the younger children, especially at Ridge. The crowding here
borders upon the criminal, and no private institution in our state
would be permitted by our State Board of Health to continue such
congestion. The extreme proximity of beds in a ward should be
no less than three feet, yet ours do not exceed six to nine inches.
Until such a time as we are able to provide more space to relieve
our congestion, new admissions to certain areas are impossible.
We hope that adequate space and facilities may be provided along
lines now projected and that, in the near future, sufficient space
for all proper applicants will be available.
With established court procedures and methods for committing patients to our institution, we have no quarrel. We believe
in the safeguards provided and feel them essential to the preserva-
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tion of human and civil rights. Our courts have been very cooperative in reviewing needs for change of custody and in giving
relief as requested, to the extent legally permissible.
In speaking of our misfits, the blind, the deaf, the incorrigible, and the several other types, we do not intend to cast aspersions upon any court. At the time these patients or inmates were
committed to our institution, available evidence supplied to the
respective court may have been insufficient to warrant any other
decision. But after opportunity to study these inmates in our
institutions, their status was more readily determinable. We are,
however, charged with the responsibility of providing these individuals with the best possible education, and for these specific
requirements, other of our state institutions are specifically
equipped and have qualified personnel.
To us the question arises, "What legal implement or procedure
is necessary, properly to transfer those of our misplaced pupils
to other of our state schools-such as for the deaf and blind?"

COLORADO STATUTES
According to Revisor Charles M. Rose, the revised
Statutes directed by the 1951 Legislature will be ready for
submission to the 1953 Legislature. It is hoped that legislative approval will be obtained; that work on the annotations, to be intensified this fall, may be completed; and
that the new Revised Statutes to be published by the State
of Colorado will be available late in 1953 or early in 1954.
This revision was sponsored by and has been actively
supported by the Colorado Bar Association. Everything
possible will be done to secure the adoption of the Revised
Statutes by the General Assembly in 1953 and to obtain
prompt publication.
Bradford-Robinson, publishers of the 1935 Colorado
Statutes Annotated, announce publication of Replacement
Volumes 3A and 3B in line with their policy of keeping the
Bar supplied with time-saving working tools in the form
of up-to-date annotated laws. Replacement of the original
Volume 3 was believed desirable because of the condition
of many of the books after 15 years of use, and because
the pocket supplement now contains 40% as many pages
as the original work, making annual republication of pocket
parts unduly expensive.
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